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Strategic Considerations In  
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Little has been written about the motorcoach industry, an industry that is largely comprised of 
small family-run businesses, and an industry that has witnessed a changed competitive environ-
ment during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s due to the impact of consolidation.  In this paper, the 
author (an insider to the industry) discusses the motorcoach industry and the effect of consolida-
tors.  Using survey data drawn from163  motorcoach owner/operators from across the country in 
early 2002, the author discusses the rising insurance cost crisis as the major concern by many op-
erators in the industry.  The link between consolidation effects and insurance costs are examined.  
From this analysis, strategic considerations for motorcoach owner/operators to ensure future via-





e are an increasingly mobile society as was evinced by the financial impact of September 11 on the 
travel industry.  While the airlines received a timely bailout to help subsize their losses, other sectors 
of the transportation industry were not covered.  One of the most widely used modes of transporta-
tion, and one that did not receive bailout funding, are motorcoaches.  In the U.S., motorcoaches carried an estimated 
774 million passengers in 1999, compared with 568 million by commercial air carriers, and 377 million by commu-
ter rail and Amtrak (ABA, 2000).  Motorcoaches are primarily used for travel by five major groups: tour groups, 
educational institutions, corporations, seniors, charter groups and commuters.   
 
Despite widespread usage of motorcoaches by many diverse groups, little has been written on the industry 
itself or the issues facing it.  This may be primarily because the industry is comprised of small, privately owned fam-
ily run businesses.  During the late 1990‟s, many changes were occurring which had tremendously negative effects 
on the industry.  Consolidation was a threat to many independents.  Revenue was flat, new equipment costs were es-
calating and overcapacity in the market was becoming commonplace. Marketing was a virtually unknown concept 
with owners adopting an order-taking approach rather than marketing their business.  Low entry barriers encouraged 
small, inexperienced players to join.  Lending companies encouraged new entrants and rapid growth with compara-
tively easy financing terms resulting in increased sales of new equipment.  Motorcoaches were viewed by many cus-
tomers as a commodity with price the major distinguishing factor. When the total operating costs were finally rea-
lized by the new entrants, companies couldn‟t afford the payments and repossessions became commonplace leading 
to an oversupply in the industry.  
 
In this paper, I first provide an overview of the motorcoach industry and discuss the effect of consolidators 
in a changed competitive environment.  Next, analysis of the industry is supplemented with actual survey results 
from 163 owner/operators in the industry that show that the insurance cost crisis is the operators major concern.  The 




Readers with comments and questions are encouraged to contact the author via email. 
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2. Overview of the Motorcoach Industry 
 
The motorcoach industry is comprised of three major business segments.  The largest segment, charter 
work, which is moving people from point to point, comprises 72% of the business, yet represents the lowest margin 
business.  Line haul (e.g., designated routes from city to city or to airport terminals) represents 18% of all motor-
coach business and tour groups comprise 10% of the motorcoach business.  Recently, the demand for motorcoach 
tours has fallen while the demand for line hauls has risen, yet few owner/operators are involved in line haul busi-
ness.  Only 12% of the companies are involved in line hauls, whereas almost 96% of the motorcoach companies are 
involved in charter operations (i.e., the hiring of a motorcoach for a specific group).  Those companies operating 
routes utilize approximately 8,000 to 10,000 motorcoaches and account for 50 percent of all motorcoach mileage 
(UMA, 2001b).   
 
The motorcoach market is made up of two basic groups: the independents (private owner/operators) and the 
consolidators.  In a 2000 Survey conducted by R. L. Banks & Associates, the motorcoach industry was estimated to 
be comprised of about 4,000 companies and about 10 percent of those are based in Canada (Schulz, 2001).  These 
companies operate approximately 44,000 buses.  The companies in the industry range from very small privately held 
companies with fewer than 5 motorcoaches to the largest consolidator with almost 3700 motorcoaches.  About nine-
ty percent of the industry is comprised of small businesses operating fewer than 25 motorcoaches.  These companies 
operate about 19,000 buses or about 40 percent of the total fleet and account for almost 40 percent of the total indus-
try mileage. It is estimated that almost half of the industry (i.e., 2000 companies) operates with fewer than 5 motor-
coaches and 65% of the companies are operating with fewer than 10 buses (ABA, 2000).   
 
The mid-sized companies are comprised of approximately 320 companies that run between 25 and 99 buses 
each.  These companies operate approximately 14,000 buses or  one-third of the total fleet and account for one-third 
of the industry mileage.  The large companies in the industry are represented by 50 companies that operate more 
than 100 buses (ABA, 2000).  The top 50 companies had total buses in 2001 of 19,047, but the total had fallen to 
14,007 by the beginning of 2002 (Starcic, 2002).  The largest companies operate about 11,000 buses or about one-
fourth of the fleet and account for 30 percent of the total industry mileage (ABA, 2000).   
 
Three consolidators are key players in the industry.  Coach USA has 3685 motorcoaches (Starcic, 2002) 
and is comprised of 188 companies representing 10% of the motorcoach business.  Laidlaw Greyhound owns 2775 
motorcoaches (Starcic, 2002) and is predominantly a line haul company with less that 1% of their business generat-
ed by tours and charters.  VEC Tours has 870 motorcoaches (Starcic, 2002) and represents 1% of the motorcoach 
business with 16 companies.  All three companies have attempted to carve out a niche in the industry in which they 
could maximize their efficiencies obtained by their size and geographic presence. The presence of the consolidators 
has led to strategic changes occurring throughout the industry. 
 
3. Motorcoach Industry Consolidators 
 
3.1. Coach USA 
 
The largest consolidator in the motorcoach industry is Coach USA.  Coach USA began in 1995 by a Hou-
ston venture capital firm and went public in 1996 posting a revenue of $185 million in that year.  In less than three 
years, Coach USA became the U.S.‟s largest provider of motorcoach charters, tour and sightseeing services.  Forty-
five percent of the company‟s business is in tour charters with the remainder divided among corporate contract bus 
service, scheduled bus services, shuttles and taxicabs.  Their business includes non-municipal/commuter/transit mo-
tor coach services and (airline) passenger ground transportation service.  Today, Coach USA operates in more than 
120 cities, and 35 states, provinces and territories in the U.S., Canada and Mexico 
(www.stagecoachplc.com/corporate/northamerica.html).  Coach USA is headquartered in Houston, Texas with re-
gional offices across the U.S. that make purchasing and revenue decisions in order to coordinate the operations with-
in the company. 
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During the late 1990s, many analysts were critical of Coach‟s fast acquisition strategy.  Coach USA was 
not particularly selective in their purchases according to some analysts in the industry and sought rapid geographic 
coverage at the expense of a well-planned strategy (Culbertson, 1998).  Coach USA‟s strategy has been to acquire 
platform operations in key convention and gateway entertainment cities.  This consolidation includes both motor-
coaches and taxicabs.  Coach USA is reluctant to acquire physical property in its acquisitions, so in many purchase 
agreements a separate entity is formed to own buildings that could then be leased back to them. 
 
The major emphasis in Coach USA‟s strategy was purchasing established companies in large markets 
across various geographic regions (Business Journal, 1996).  Coach USA had value for potential suitors because it 
positioned itself as a company with a broad geographic presence.  Coach‟s strategy was to purchase family busi-
nesses with revenues of between $20 million and $40 million.  The average age of the companies purchased was 
close to 40 years.  Coach USA sought to retain the experienced managers in these companies for the short-term.  
Many of the initial acquisitions had five-year employment agreements with the previous owners. 
 
In June 1999, Coach USA was acquired by Stagecoach, a Scottish company that was involved in public 
transportation consolidation on a worldwide basis.  In addition to running trains and buses in the U.K., Stagecoach 
had companies in Australia, Finland, Portugal, New Zealand, and Hong Kong and owned a stake in a Chinese toll 
road company (www.stagecoachplc.com).   
 
Similar to the strategy employed by Coach USA, Stagecoach had grown through acquisitions and is consi-
dered the largest consolidator of transportation companies in Britain.  Stagecoach‟s purchase of Coach USA was 
viewed as a means for Stagecoach to enter the fragmented U.S. motorcoach market and a vehicle for further acquisi-
tions in the U.S. (Apte, 1999).  
 
When Stagecoach bought Coach USA, many of the previous owners who had made their family businesses 
successful were choosing to leave because they were no longer making the managerial decisions for their companies 
and/or their employment agreements were ending.  In some cases, owners had been forced out due to regional con-
solidation within Coach USA.  This had resulted in the loss of experienced operators managing some of their com-
panies.  In 2001, Stagecoach was forced to write down its investment in Coach USA (Jowit, 2001) and cut its fore-
cast in half (Osborne, 2001).  Recently, Coach USA has experienced restructuring due to estimated revenue short-




The second largest consolidator in the motorcoach industry is Greyhound (a predominantly line haul com-
pany).  Greyhound Bus lines which was founded in 1914, has operated independently in the U.S. since it was spun 
off from Dial Corp. in March of 1987.  A few months after the spin off, Greyhound bought its only nationwide com-
petitor, Trailways Inc.  Since then, Greyhound has been the only national bus line with route coverage in the U.S. 
serving more than 2,600 destinations with 18,000 daily departures (Fairbank, 1998).   
 
Laidlaw, a Canadian company became interested in Greyhound because it complemented part of its core 
business which was school bus transportation, intercity, and public transit and tour services.  Despite Laidlaw‟s Ca-
nadian roots, the company conducts over 90% of its business in the U.S.  In March 1999 Laidlaw purchased Grey-
hound Lines at the peak of the consolidation phase in the U.S.  (Fairbank, 1998).  Laidlaw felt that this acquisition 
would achieve cost savings in vehicle purchase, insurance, financing and office costs.  Laidlaw also planned to ex-
pand Greyhound‟s small charter and tour bus business by making acquisitions in a fragmented market and marketing 
its brand name (De Santis and Tomsho, 1998). 
 
Laidlaw is also a major provider of school bus transportation and has a dominant presence throughout the 
U.S. in school bus operations.  School buses provide a constant flow of dollars throughout the school year and can 
be used to supplement “low seasons” in the motorcoach part of the business. Many motorcoach owners provide 
school bus transportation as part of their business. 
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Laidlaw is a diversified company that has experienced negative cash flow from parts of its operations.  
Buses have resulted in positive revenue flows for Laidlaw, but its broad business strategies have created severe fi-
nancial problems.  Revenues for Laidlaw during fiscal 2000 increased 7.6% to $1.428 billion for school bus trans-
portation and increased 60.2% to $1,498 billion for intercity, public transit and tour services.  Its losses in other 
areas led to a $3.4 billion U.S. debt problem and resulted in Laidlaw stock trading at 12.5 cents by January 2001 
compared with $22 in early 1998 (Westell, 2000).  Laidlaw explained its difficulties in its broad business as a result 
of losses on discontinued health-care operations and on bankruptcy – with possible accounting irregularities – of its 
Safety Kleen Corp. hazardous-waste unit (Phillips, 2000). 
 
3.3. VECTour Inc. 
 
The third largest motorcoach consolidator, VECTour Inc., began as Travelways in May 1997, as an enter-
tainment and sightseeing company.  They were also involved in selling rail tours and had airport routes.  By October 
1999, Travelways had acquired over 25 independent tour companies with revenues exceeding $150 million.  It had 
800 motorcoaches and more than 300 town cars, vans and limos based at 46 facilities in 12 states 
(www.VECTour.com). 
 
In December 2000, Travelways became VECTour Inc., a transportation and tour creation company. VEC 
Tour has a broad geographic base in the U.S. and operates using a decentralized approach from 19 locations with 
headquarters in Blue Bell, PA (www.VECTour.com).  Each company in VECTour Inc. has its own rules for work-
ing with agents, commissions or quoting net rates. VECTour‟s strategy has been to grow internally as a privately 
held company.   
 
VECTour Inc. focuses on selling domestic motorcoach tours and tours to international areas which is a dif-
ferent market segment than the one served by Coach USA or Greyhound.  Similarly, all consolidators provide char-
ter services.  Due to its reliance on the tour segment, VEC Tours Inc. filed for Chapter 11 on October 17, 2001, 
claiming that they had experienced a 50% drop in travel after September 11. 
 
4. Consolidator Business Practices 
 
Consolidation by the three largest players was at first thought to develop economies of scale due to centra-
lized management and operating efficiencies.  The gains accrue in centralizing functions such as finance, administra-
tive support, purchasing power and a national sales and marketing program.  Expected gains included obtaining 
competitive advantages and cost savings through group purchasing power, discounted group insurance, long-
distance telephone, customer referral as well as global marketing and advertising efforts.  Consolidators also planned 
to gain by brand recognition.  The trademark (e.g., Coach USA or Trailways) provides international recognition 
while retaining local, state or regional company names and identities. 
 
In reality, the overall financial performance has not been superior to the independent operators and regio-
nally managed consolidators have not best served the interests of customers in developing on-going relationships.  A 
common practice with consolidators is to allow the companies to remain under local control with no immediate 
changes in name, employees, or management.  However, many experienced owner/operators are no longer in the 
business as they were bought out and left the business or completed their short-term employment contracts with re-
gional managers now making the operating decisions for the firms. Two of the three major consolidators have filed 
for Chapter 11 protection. 
 
Consolidators may have some minor advantages over small operators when mass movements are being 
made.  Much of the growth in the motorcoach industry is due to the demand for large-scale events such as major 
sporting events. Consolidators have several motorcoaches at their disposal as they may own several companies with-
in a geographic region.  Consolidators actively seek out mass movements such as convention trade that requires 
many motorcoaches providing transportation for participants from hotels to convention facilities and to dinner and 
entertainment facilities.  Consolidators, like Coach USA have attempted to capitalize on this market, but in huge 
movements even consolidators rely on the experienced owner/operators in that area.  It is costly to bring in motor-
coaches from other regions for short-term events when local motorcoaches are available. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 1, Number 12 
 93 
5. Private Owner/Operators – How Have they been affected by the Change? 
 
The motorcoach business requires long hours including weekends with enormous capital expenditures.  
New motorcoaches cost approximately $400,000.  Pre-deregulation profits in the industry averaged 15-20% so there 
was financial incentive to stay in the business despite the huge investment.  Low cost financing programs permitted 
an exchange of equity for cash flow and owners would purchase new or newer equipment to update fleets that pro-
vided a competitive advantage and generated depreciation write-offs.   
 
Many motorcoach operators have sought to retain and grow their businesses by offering superior service 
and consistency in management leading to the development of on-going relationships with their customers.  Rela-
tionships are difficult to maintain by the consolidators as management changes and decisions are made at the region-
al or national levels. 
 
Many motorcoach businesses receive cross-subsidies from other internal businesses.   Some owners subsid-
ize their motorcoach business by providing mechanical services or have school bus operations that provide a guaran-
teed revenue stream.  These revenues can be used to subsidize the motorcoach division during their “slow” season.  
Companies that depend on charter work are reliant on outside calls or contracts in which they provide price-
competitive bids. On many occasions, owner/operators will be “sold out” of their equipment on the weekend, getting 
back-ups from other companies and will then struggle with overcapacity (i.e., unused motorcoaches) during the 
week.  Private owner/operators will develop working relationships with other companies in their geographic area 
and help one another out when they are overbooked.  This practice, in part, parallels the sharing of motorcoaches by 
the consolidators when mass movements are involved.   
 
6. What Do Owner/Operators See as the Major Concern Confronting their Industry Today? 
 
A survey was developed in order to ascertain the major issues confronting the motorcoach industry.  Survey 
data was collected from 163 motorcoach owner/operators in January and February 2002 at the two national conven-
tions for the industry: the United Motorcoach Association (UMA) and the American Bus Association (ABA).  These 
two associations represent motorcoach industry owner/operators and provide advice and information regarding go-
vernmental requirements and changes to owner/operators as well as provide lobbying efforts on the industry‟s be-
half.   
 
The survey respondents represented all regions of the U.S.  Forty percent of the 155 owner/operators who 
indicated a region on the survey were located on the East Coast, 39% of the respondents were from the Midwest, 
14% of the respondents were from the South and 8% from the West Coast.  Thirty-five percent of the respondents 
indicated that they were also involved in school bus operations, a corollary business. 
 
7. Spiraling Insurance Premiums is Major Problem in the Motorcoach Industry 
 
Motorcoach owner operators concluded that the major problem they are confronted with is spiraling insur-
ance premiums.  Of the 136 operators responding to this survey question, twenty-nine percent of the own-
er/operators ranked this as the number one concern that they are facing and an additional thirty-nine percent ranked 
it as number two.  Insurance costs are increasing at an alarming rate often rising 35% or higher from the previous 
year.  Many companies have limited their liability insurance reducing coverage from $10 million to $5 million, the-
reby accepting more risk in order to maintain their costs. 
 
The impact of consolidators in reducing the number of carriers has led to increases in the private own-
er/operators insurance costs.  O‟Neill (2002) claims that there are several factors that have severely impacted bus in-
surers leading to price increases.  Consolidators ended up eliminating about $20 million to $25 million in premium 
and reduced the industry‟s ability to spread risk.  Driver shortages led to an increase in claim frequency because in-
experienced drivers were involved in accidents at a significantly higher rate than more experienced drivers.  Medical 
costs were escalating when accidents or injuries occurred.  Due to higher claim costs, insurers began dropping buses 
as part of their provided coverage and focused on a different market segment (e.g., automobile coverage).  Finally, 
reinsurers, large companies that insure those who insure the business, suffered after September 11 that resulted in a 
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domino effect throughout the industry (Dolan, 2002). 
Some motorcoach owners have responded to this insurance crisis by considering other insurance options.  
One option that has recently gained favor in the industry is the use of a captive insurance rather than a general insur-
ance company.  A captive insurance company is one that is essentially formed by members of a particular industry 
to cover that industry.  Captive insurance companies provide an advantage in that they create stability in the pricing 
structure over time, rather than being subjected to gyrating costs in the industry.  While general insurance companies 
may be lower during strong markets, captives are more consistent in price overall.  Captive insurers know their in-
dustry so they are generally able to come up with effective loss control recommendations, which can reduce both the 
cost of losses and premiums.  Captives will also offer expert witnesses and full litigation support whereas general in-
surance companies often have an adversarial relationship with their clients and give them minimal input in any set-
tlement action (Dolan, 2002).  This resulting claim loss can lead to higher insurance premiums in the future.  It is es-
timated that one-third of the largest bus companies either have captive insurance or will be moving to captives in 
2002 due to these benefits (Dolan, 2002). 
 
 Insurance in the motorcoach industry is based on the number of buses, average mileage, previous claims 
and geographic location.  It is not an acceptable practice in the industry for owners to cancel insurance during low 
activity periods.  This means that even during slower “off-seasons” the insurance is the same as during the working 
seasons and the costs must still be met.  In addition to liability insurance, owner/operators are responsible for physi-
cal damage insurance that varies significantly by the value of the equipment.  Insurance in this area has also been in-
creasing by more than 50%.  Some companies have responded to this increase by increasing their deductible, there-
by accepting greater risk. 
 
This survey finding differs from previous studies where driver shortages have consistently been ranked as a 
number 1 problem in the industry (Kerckhoff, 2001).  However, it is important to note that driver shortages contri-
bute to the insurance cost problem.  Depressed driver wages contribute to a high turnover rate in the industry and re-
sults in higher costs for owner/operators in the areas of training and recruiting.  Newer drivers lack the experience of 
more seasoned drivers and are more prone to accidents that impact insurance rates.  Other problems facing the in-
dustry as indicated by the motorcoach respondents include the business decline since September 11, the cost of new 
equipment, depressed trade in values on used equipment, driver shortages and the lack of maintenance support from 
manufacturers and suppliers. 
 
The insurance crisis may act as a barrier for new entrants in the marketplace. New motorcoach entrants will 
experience more difficulty in meeting financial obligations due to increased insurance costs and financing difficul-
ties that have engulfed the industry.  For seasoned owner/operators this should mean fewer new competitors, but in-
dicates the need for motorcoach operators to develop a strategy to cover their rising costs.  This realization by mo-
torcoach owner/operators may be one of the reasons that although the industry is experiencing a downturn, seasoned 
owner operators indicate that they are optimistic about their future.  Sixty-one percent of the 153 respondents indi-




The motorcoach industry has changed very quickly and owner/operators are faced with the effects of con-
solidation and the declines in ridership due to the recent terrorist activity.  Consolidation, which greatly changed the 
number of companies and operators in the industry, only represents about 10% of the industry and has not been the 
panacea in the marketplace nor the threat that independent owner/operators anticipated.  The bankruptcy filings and 
downsizing by the consolidators may mean a more focused approach to establishing a strong market niche for their 
business in the immediate future.  
 
What do these changes mean for individual owner/operators?  Insurance costs need to be examined and 
consideration given to captive versus general insurance companies.  There are some major advantages of captive 
companies and these should be explored before blindly continuing an existing policy.  Owners should carefully ex-
amine their insurance claims and note patterns (e.g., individuals involved including age and experience, types of 
equipment, locations, time of day, accident causes) in order to determine how these claims can be prevented and 
ways to establish policies and procedures that will result in fewer claims in the future.  Insurance premiums are de-
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pendent on previous claims. 
Second, operating ratios for equipment needs to be carefully examined.  Owner/operators should consider if 
their motorcoach business is self-supporting or is being subsidized bye related businesses.  Are owner/operators 
charging enough to cover their costs?  Simply keeping the equipment moving may not generate enough revenue to 
cover the costs associated with the business, particularly as costs are rising.  Owners should examine usage levels 
and determine if the business they currently have warrants the expense of the number and type and/or size of their 
fleet and corresponding insurance costs.  Operating ratios are beneficial for owners because they provide indicators 
that companies can use to benchmark themselves against.  It can help them determine where they should apply their 
resources, how much money they should spend in particular areas such as maintenance and the revenue required to 
remain profitable.  UMA has recently made this benchmarking information available to owner/operators in the in-
dustry (UMA, 2001). 
 
Third, enhanced marketing efforts are needed when the industry is facing a downturn.  A marketing plan is 
needed which will provide direction to the company and a focus on the niche that it is seeking.  The owner/operator 
cannot find success in attempting to be all things to all customers.  The owner/operator needs to decide who they are 
and what they do best in order to succeed.  Due to the downsizing and consolidation that has occurred, own-
er/operators market reach can be expanded.  It is critical to stress the importance of on-going relationships as that is 
a major distinguishing factor from the consolidators that have lost some of that experience and connections they had 
when they centralized their operations. 
 
Finally, owner/operators should consider how they are spending their time.  Are owner/operators running 
the business as a family business with the operator spending all of his time taking phone calls, maintaining equip-
ment and driving the equipment or is the owner engaged in actively developing strategies for his business to suc-
ceed? Developing and re-evaluating a workable strategy is the most important job for an owner/operator in today‟s 
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